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Abstract 
 
Various methodologies in economic literature have been used to analyse the international 
hydrocarbon retail sector. Nevertheless at a Spanish level these studies are much more 
recent and most conclude that generally there is no effective competition present in this 
market, regardless of the approach used. In this paper, in order to analyse the price levels in 
the Spanish petrol market, our starting hypothesis is that in uncompetitive markets the 
prices are higher and the standard deviation is lower. We use weekly retail petrol price data 
from the ten biggest Spanish cities, and apply Markov chains to fill the missing values for 
petrol 95 and diesel, and we also employ a variance filter. We conclude that this market 
demonstrates reduced price dispersion, regardless of brand or city. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades the Spanish petrol market has undergone an immense restructuring 
process, the main objective of which has been to introduce competition into the sector. 
The main petrol sector regulation (Law 34/1992) established the sector as being a service 
of general interest, provided by free agents and under the terms of competition. 
Nonetheless, as the paper by Perdiguero and Borrell (2008) states in its title, it is difficult to 
achieve competition in the sector; and in practice, there still seem to be various factors that 
impede this original objective.  
As Bello and Cavero (2008) indicate and Correljé (1990) previously analysed, the Spanish 
petrol market has passed from being natural monopoly to being totally liberated in less 
than twenty years. It is the importance of this market to economic development and the 
extent of the restructuring process that has attracted the attention of researchers. Contín et 
al. (1999) analysed the evolution of petrol prices during and after the intense restructuring 
process, and indicated that its behaviour did not reflect perfect competition. Contín et al. 
(2001) also point out that the private and unregulated oil pipeline monopoly may be a key 
obstacle to the effective development of competition within the market. Continuing with 
price analysis, Contín et al. (2008 and 2009) show how the diesel and unleaded petrol prices 
symmetrically incorporate the international wholesale price changes.4 
Despite intense analysis there is little evidence as to whether, either tacit of explicit, 
collusion exists in the Spanish petrol market. Save for Perdiguero (2006) and Perdiguero 
and Jiménez (2009), who have respectively analysed the existence of collusive equilibria in 
Spain and in the Canary Islands, there is no robust empirical evidence on price behaviour 
in this market. This surely indicates the restricted number of methodologies available in the 
international literature to detect the existence of cartels or collusive agreements.  
One of the most recent methodologies proposed, and which has still to be applied to the 
Spanish market is variance filtering. Abrantes et al. (2006) conclude that the companies 
involved in collusive agreements keep their average prices higher and also have reduced 
variance; that is to say there is a greater price rigidity compared to those markets where this 
type of anticompetitive agreement doesn’t exist. The use is of this evidence to empirically 
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compare and contrast the existence of such collusive agreements is rare, to date only 
Abrantes et al. (2006) and Bolotova et al. (2008) have empirically applied this evidence.5 
Our aim is to apply this new empirical technique to the Spanish petrol market, so as to 
confirm the existence of collusive agreements; moreover we want to complement and back 
up the results of the aforementioned papers. 
This article will contribute to the gathering of empirical evidence on how this technique 
works when evaluating collusive agreements; for example, its role in the Spanish petrol 
market, where such accords do indeed appear to exist. It is worth pointing out that this is 
the first time this technique has been applied to a European market. Secondly, we use a 
database that enables us to access weekly information on all the service stations operating 
in the ten biggest Spanish cities, in terms of population; and we can observe the different 
behaviour among the relevant geographical markets. Thirdly and finally, we provide 
evidence on how petrol prices function in Spain. The results will complement those 
previously obtained by other authors, and will help us to evaluate the restructuring process 
of the Spanish petrol market.  
Our main results indicate symmetrical behaviour by the different companies and for 
different regions, but there are exceptions. Despite this price behaviour it still may fit in 
with either a price equilibrium or with collusion. Some empirical evidence suggests that the 
latter is a far more plausible explanation for the market that we have analysed. 
The study is organized in the following way. After this introduction in Section 2 we 
develop the variance filter methodology in greater detail. In Section 3 we describe the 
database we use, and in Section 4 we assign the missing values and include them with the 
empirical results. In the final part, Section 5, we present the main conclusions of the study. 
2. Filter variance as an empirical approach. 
As we pointed in the previous section, variance filter methodology grew from the idea that 
the price dynamics of a market where companies collude are different to those of a 
competitive industry, when measured in terms of averages and price variance. Both the 
economic theory and the available empirical evidence on cartel behaviour and collusion 
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agreements suggest that the average prices will be higher in an uncompetitive market; 
moreover, a significant reduction in the dispersion, or standard deviation, of the prices 
would also be expected.  
With respect to the theoretical literature, there is a wide variety of models that show a 
positive relationship between collusion and price rigidity. It is worth pointing out that the 
article by Athey et al. (2004) states that the information costs associated with revealing 
costs cause greater price rigidity. In the model by Harrington and Chen (2006), in order to 
minimize the possibility of being detected, the companies don’t fully incorporate the cost 
variations, and this brings about reduced price flexibility. There are equally numerous 
theoretical models on collusive behaviour in the sphere of auction analysis (Feinstein et al., 
1985 o LaCasse, 1995). They also indicate that there is lower price dispersion under the 
terms of collusive behaviour, and Feinstein et al. (1985) provide empirical evidence to this 
effect. 
As for the empirical evidence, Genesove and Mullin (2001) show how the collusive accord 
in the sugar refining industry caused higher prices and greater inflexibility in periods of 
competition. Brannon (2003) analysed the introduction of laws to prevent sales at a loss in 
the petrol market. This culminated in collusive agreements in the US state of Wisconsin, 
and resulted in higher prices and less dispersion. Finally, Abrantes et al. (2006) analysed the 
conspiracy among companies to raise the price of fish sales to the U.S. Department of 
Defense from 1984 to 1989. The cartel ceased to operate at the end of 1988. The authors 
used this point in time to demonstrate that the competitive average price was 16% lower 
and the variance 263% higher than when the price agreement was working.6 
Despite the existence of so many theoretical arguments as empirical evidence of collusive 
markets showing higher prices and lower variations, it is still rare that a variance filter has 
been applied to detect such behaviour. We have only found two articles, by Abrantes et al. 
(2006) and Bolotova et al. (2008), which analyse price behaviour using a variance filter. 
Abrantes et al. (2006) use a variance filter to attempt to find out which service stations in 
the US state of Kentucky have higher than average prices and low variance, in order to 
detect possible indicators of collusion in the retail petrol market. However, since all the 
points of sale showed similar behaviour there were no conclusive results. Bolotova et al. 
(2008) analysed the price evolutions in the citric acid and lysine market, where collusive 
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accords had been discovered. In both cases the prices were higher during the periods of 
collusion. However, in the case of lysine the price variance decreased during the period of 
collusion, whereas in the case of citric acid it increased.  
This methodology has not been applied to the petrol market in Spain, and this study 
attempts to cover this lack in the application of the methodology. It uses an average and 
variance filter to try to detect the “suspicious” price dynamics that might indicate 
uncompetitive behaviour in the local petrol 95 and diesel markets, by using weekly retail 
price data. 
3. Data 
The data comes from the website of the Spanish Government’s Ministry of Industry, Trade 
and Tourism (from now on, the Ministry), which is updated every Wednesday. We 
obtained the published price, expressed in euros per litre, for all the service stations 
operating in the ten largest Spanish cities measured in terms of population for 2007. 
According to the Spanish National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
INE) they are, in order of size: Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Sevilla, Zaragoza, Málaga, 
Murcia, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Palma de Mallorca and Bilbao.  
The database covers 27 weeks from April to December 2008, and consists of 544 service 
stations selling petrol 95 and 548 selling diesel, though not all of these stations provided all 
the data for the sample period. However, if we exclude those stations with a significant 
number of missing values, we could encounter problems with the sample’s bias. For petrol 
95 of the 13,121 values some 11.9% were unavailable, and for diesel 14.0% of the 12,974 
results were not available. Nonetheless, as we explained in the previous section this 
potential bias has been minimized by using a Markov chain Monte Carlo to assign the 
missing values. 
However, before assigning the results we analyse whether the stations with less information 
could bring about a self selection sampling problem. Possibly the companies providing less 
or generally poorer quality data are those behaving “less competitively”. In this case, the 
potential problem is apparently less important, because the stations with missing values are 
as representative as any of the other companies. For diesel, the companies with over 50% 
of their values missing have the following distribution within the total population: Repsol 
28.2%, Cepsa 13.0%, Campsa 13.0%, Shell 15.2% and Galp 4.3%. 
The database includes the net price, in order to permit the comparison of cities. While 
within the mainland Spain the taxes to be taken into account are the special taxes, the 
regional taxes known as the “céntimo sanitario”, and VAT; however, in the Canary Islands 
there is only the special tax and the AIEM tax (Arbitrio sobre la Importación y Entrega de 
Mercancías), which is a tariff to specifically protect the internal industry. 
Next, we briefly summarize the data, both for the brands and for the cities, by using the 
price average and standard deviation. Table 1 shows the average prices for the six biggest 
fuel brands in the analysis, in terms of service station numbers. “Others” refers to the sum 
of the other independent fuel companies, or companies that have a lower numbers of 
stations. Both the average prices and the standard deviation for petrol 95 are similar for all 
brands, whether they are Campsa or the Others which have lower prices for both products. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (by Brand) 
 Petrol 95 Diesel 
Brand PA Nº P.S. S.D.A PA Nº P.S. S.D.A
Repsol 0.572 147 0.102 0.704 149 0.114
Cepsa 0.578 103 0.102 0.704 105 0.114
Campsa 0.567 78 0.102 0.701 79 0.115
British Petroleum (BP) 0.584 44 0.099 0.709 44 0.112
Galp 0.571 23 0.103 0.702 22 0.114
Shell 0.586 35 0.099 0.709 36 0.112
Others 0.569 114 0.101 0.699 113 0.114
Total 0.574 544 0.101 0.704 548 0.114
Source: Own elaboration. 
Note: PA is the average price. Nº P.S. is the number of petrol stations. S.D.A is the average 
standard deviation. 
 
Table 2 reflects the same descriptive statistics but makes a distinction between the cities. 
You will notice that for all the products the highest prices are in the city of Las Palmas de 
Gran Canaria, which may be due to higher transportation and commercialisation costs. 
With respect to the other cities, petrol 95 is higher priced in Palma de Mallorca, Sevilla and 
Valencia; the figures range from 0.566 in Murcia to 0.625 in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. 
As for diesel, the variations range between 0.698 in Zaragoza and 0.726 cents per litre in 
Las Palmas de Gran Canaria.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (by City) 
 Petrol 95 Diesel 
City PA Nº P.S. S.D.A PA Nº P.S. S.D.A 
Madrid 0.570 163 0.103 0.701 164 0.115
Barcelona 0.569 77 0.102 0.702 77 0.116
Valencia 0.571 43 0.102 0.701 43 0.115
Sevilla 0.571 49 0.101 0.704 53 0.114
Zaragoza 0.569 41 0.102 0.698 43 0.115
Málaga 0.569 43 0.101 0.700 45 0.115
Murcia 0.566 29 0.103 0.699 29 0.115
Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 0.625 48 0.092 0.726 45 0.104
Palma Majorca 0.572 42 0.101 0.705 42 0.114
Bilbao 0.569 9 0.102 0.704 7 0.115
Total 0.575 544 0.101 0.704 548 0.114
Source: Own elaboration. 
Note: PA is the average price. Nº P.S. is the number of petrol stations. S.D.A is the average 
standard deviation. 
 
4. Empirical strategy and results 
The first step is to “fill in” the missing data with predicted or simulated values. For this, we 
follow the paper by Abrantes-Metz et al (2006), which discusses the possible options; i.e. 
mean substitution, simple hot deck, regression methods and imputation methods. 
Arguments are also presented for choosing the imputation methods, specifically Gibbs 
sampling combined with data augmentation method, which is a type of Markov chain 
Monte Carlo. 
In general, multiple imputations are drawn from a Bayesian predictive distribution: 
     , | | , |m o m o op z z p z z p z d      
 
Where oz  is the data vector, zm  is the missing observations and   is the model 
parameters. The Gibbs sampling tries to estimate the numerical approximation of 
( ) | oE g z   , where g   is a function of interest, as the mean or standard deviation of 
prices for some subset of petrol stations. 
In our case, we denote otz  as the observed values and zmt  as missing values. The 
distribution of the unknown parameters   and zmt , conditional on the known oz being the 
next predictive distribution: 
             0 0 0, | , , , , , |m o m mp z z p z z p z p z z p z p p z          
 
Specifically, the interpolation for the missing values uses next first-order autoregressive 
model: 
zit  it  i zit1  i   it  
 
Where zit  is the difference between price station i on day t minus average daily price. 
Assuming itiid : N 0, i2 , the model permits a station to have prices that tend to be 
higher or lower than average by using i . 
We would like to state that for all the aforementioned service stations we have presented 
the total population not a sample. We have calculated the average price and the standard 
deviation for each station for the twenty-seven weeks of the study. The analysis that we 
have carried out is for the two types of fuels that have the greatest demand. 
It should be borne in mind that, after reviewing the whole market for the ten most 
important cities in Spain, the aim of this paper is to identify those service stations with 
higher average prices than the mean for all service stations and low standard deviations. 
Nevertheless, there is no established predetermined value, either in the theory or in the 
empirical evidence. In order to establish a benchmark the initial threshold, in accordance 
with Abrantes-Metz et al, was all the service stations with standard deviation at least 50% 
lower than the combined average for the population that have a higher price average.  
We analyse two products with characteristics that differ principally in terms of demand. 
The starting point for our hypothesis is that there is a greater probability of collusive 
behaviour in the product that best fulfils the factors described by Ivaldi et al (2003). Even 
though we don’t include diesel for professional purposes in the analysis, the empirical 
evidence indicates that there greater absolute price elasticity of demand for diesel than 
petrol. This could indicate a lesser probability of levels of collusion with respect to petrol 
95, whose use is exclusively domestic, and is more inelastic than diesel (Dahl and Sterner, 
1991). 
The results for petrol 95 are shown in Graphs 1 and 2, as well as in Annex I. In this case 
the average price of petrol was 0.575 euros per litre, with a standard deviation of 0.101 
euros. Figure 1 includes the 544 petrol stations analysed, and at first sight it can be seen 
that the majority of them conform with a cloud of points around the average values; the 
exceptions are the service stations in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, which have higher 
averages and whose deviations are somewhat lower that the mean.  
In fact, the stations that could be considered “suspicious” are those located in the II 
Quadrant, at the bottom right of the graph; those with a higher than average price and low 
standard deviation. With this approach there are 68 stations situated in this quadrant, which 
are comparatively distributed within each city. 70.6% are stations in Las Palmas de Gran 
Canaria, 10.3% are in Madrid, 7.4% in Sevilla, 4.4% in Barcelona, 2.9% in Valencia and 
1.5% in Málaga, Murcia and Zaragoza. None of the petrol stations breach the 50% lower 
than standard deviation threshold, and as such we can’t prove the existence of collusion.   
However, we must bear in mind that among the cities there may be cost differences, such 
as transport, labour and land prices, which influence the previous results. Thus, petrol 
transport costs may be higher in the archipelagos, and this could explain that higher 
percentage of service stations from Las Palmas in the II Quadrant. To avoid this problem, 
the previous analysis has been carried out city by city, to allow for the different competitive 
dynamics that have developed. 
Figure 1: Average Deviation and Price. Petrol 95. Total Sample.  
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Source: own elaboration from data provided by the Ministry 
Note: The average prices are expressed in euros per litre of fuel. 
 
The results for petrol 95 are shown in Graph 2 and in Annex I, Graph 5. In them we can 
see that the competition behaviour at a local level is also homogeneous in the group 
analysis, given that no groups of stations are highlighted as having behaviour that is 
significantly different to the average result, especially in the II quadrant. 
 
Figure2: Average Deviation and Price for Petrol 95 in Barcelona and Madrid 
  
Source: Own elaboration from data provided by the Ministry. 
Note: The prices are expressed in euros per litre of fuel. 
 
The Graphs 3, 4 and 6 in Annex II show the values for diesel. Given the fiscal differences, 
the average prices for petrol 95 are higher in all the stations, 0.704 euros per litre versus 
0.574 for petrol 95. As might be expected the standard deviation for this product is higher 
compared to petrol 95, possibly brought about by the aforementioned differences in price 
elasticity of demand, which in turn are due to the greater heterogeneity in the types of 
consumers. 
In this case, the greater number of stations are in the II Quadrant (Gasoline 95). The 
distribution for cities is as follows: 47.4% for Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 26.3% for 
Palma de Mallorca, 11.6% for Madrid, 8.4% for Sevilla, 2.1% for Barcelona and Murcia and 
1.1% for Valencia and Zaragoza. Nevertheless, as with the other product, the threshold of 
a lower than 50% average deviation of population was not breached. 
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Figure 3: Average Deviation and Price. Diesel. Total Sample. 
 
Source: Own elaboration from data provided by the Ministry. 
Note: The prices are expressed in euros per litre of fuel. 
 
In the analysis by city, no explicit evidence of anomalous behaviour has been found 
in any of the localities; see Figures 4 and 6 in Annex II. However, as previously 
mentioned in the combined Figure 3, the standard deviation is higher compared to 
the sample of petrol 95 for each city. 
Figure 4: Average Deviation and Price for Diesel in Barcelona and Madrid. 
Source: Own elaboration from data provided by the Ministry. 
Note: The prices are expressed in euros per litre of fuel. 
. 
When interpreting the previous results, one relevant aspect of the petrol industry should be 
borne in mind. Due to the large volumes and frequency of consumption, the petrol 
industry is not characterized by large margins from few sales. It gains huge profits through 
large volumes of sales, and for this reason small price changes can significantly affect 
profits causing prices to seem very similar. The 50% threshold, in terms of the difference in 
standard deviation as defined by Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006), may be excessive for this 
market. So, in the following table we present the mean and the standard deviation of those 
stations furthest from both of the means. This is in order to see whether, in spite of not 
dipping down to the 50% threshold, different behaviour is shown. These values show a 
maximum percentage of variation when compared to the average price and a minimum 
percentage in variation with respect to the average standard deviation. 
 
Table 3: Maximum Range of Variation in Quadrant II by City 
 
% Maximum Highest Price  
Deviation with Respect to Average 
Prices 
% Maximum Lowest Deviation 
with respect to the Average 
Standard Deviation 
 Petrol 95 Diesel Petrol 95 Diesel
Madrid 3,90 3,49 -6,52 -11,05
Barcelona 1,08 1,21 -2,47 -8,55
Valencia 1,39 1,64 -4,74 -5,73
Sevilla 2,54 1,39 -1,81 -4,91
Zaragoza 0,78 1,50 -3,12 -5,87
Málaga 1,25 0,82 -4,05 -3,14
Murcia 0,78 1,39 -4,24 -3,64
Las Palmas de 
Gran Canaria 
0,60 0,88 -1,56 -4,83
Palma de Mallorca 0,15 0,35 -2,04 -4,01
Bilbao 0 0 0 0
Source: Own elaboration from data provided by the Ministry. 
 
As can be seen from this data, neither of the products have an accentuated difference, 
when compared to each other. The result for deviation is relatively different to the previous 
one and shows no clear pattern. Petrol 95, rather than diesel, is the product where there is 
the greater probability of collusion. Despite all this, the results are far from the thresholds 
established by Abrantes-Metz. The maximum deviation is close to 4% for the average price 
and 11% for the standard deviation, which is well short of the 50% defined by the authors. 
Moreover, in terms of cities, there is no evidence of heterogeneous results among the 
service stations. 
As it stands, it is not possible to conclude from these results that collusion exists in any of 
the markets. In fact, with exceptions, the symmetrical behaviour we have just demonstrated 
could equally represent either a highly competitive situation or perfect collusion. However, 
the empirical evidence from previous studies seems to support to a greater degree the 
existence of an uncompetitive equilibrium. For example, in his dynamic analysis Perdiguero 
(2006) concludes that the level of competition in the sector at a national level is low. 
Borrell and Perdiguero (2008) show the problems that still remain and impede the goal of 
improving market competition. While Perdiguero and Jiménez (2009) confirm, by using 
conjectural variation, that the behaviour of petrol retailers in the autonomous region of the 
Canary Islands is closer to tacit collusion than to any other market structure. This probably 
keeps the standard deviation of the service stations in Las Palmas lower, both for petrol 95 
and diesel. 
For this reason, the market results for Las Palmas de Gran Canaria may be considered 
“very uncompetitive”, but can be viewed as a benchmark for the other cities. While the 
data for the average cannot be compared directly, the standard deviation can. By 
contrasting the average of the deviations for the stations in each city with the figure for Las 
Palmas, we have found that the Las Palmas prices are 10.1% higher for diesel and 11.5% 
higher than the other cities for petrol 95. 
The closeness of the results indicate that the level of competition in the mainland cities and 
in Palma de Mallorca could be slightly higher that the level in Las Palmas. Nonetheless, the 
differences in the standard deviation for both groups are so small that we are unable us to 
assert that this competition is effective. They have very similar behaviour, which is close to 
collusion. 
5. Conclusions 
The first steps to liberalize the Spanish hydrocarbon market were taken over two decades 
ago, but the objective of reaching a competitive market doesn’t seem to have been reached. 
Despite the importance of this sector within the economy, and the ongoing deregulation 
process, there are still impediments to the presence of competition that reduce the 
possibilities of improving social welfare. 
The academic interest in this sector has now become international, although in Spain the 
interest is relatively recent and there is not an abundance of these analyses. Some papers 
have covered this area of analysis using dynamic, structural and rockets and feathers 
models. Alternatively, they have studied the problems for competition that the wholesale-
retail vertical relationships or the distributors cause. To date the so called “variance filter” 
has not been used. This methodology is based both on theoretical articles, such as the 
empirical evidence that affirms that all markets in collusion show higher prices, and lower 
than market average standard deviation. 
We used the sale price data for the twenty-seven weeks between April and December 2008, 
and started with the hypothesis that the markets in collusion have higher prices and lower 
standard deviation. Then we established a database for the ten largest cities in Spain terms 
of population, and for all the service stations that they have. We assigned figures for the 
missing values by using Markov chains. 
The empirical results show that for the two types of fuel, the service stations set very 
homogeneous prices; i.e. their average prices and standard deviations are similar. Secondly, 
similar behaviour among the petrol stations is more evident for petrol 95 than for diesel. 
Thirdly, the margins in price variation, when compared to the average and standard 
deviation, are not significant enough to confirm heterogeneous behaviour among retailers, 
even when analysed city by city. The homogeneity of prices and standard deviation equally 
fit the dynamics of competition or collusion. Despite this, empirical results from previous 
papers, and the similarities in behaviour between Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and the rest 
of the cities in the study seem to support to a greater extent the possibility of there not 
being effective competition in this sector. 
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Anex I 
 
Figure 5: Price and standard deviation analysis. Gasoline 95 (Other cities) 
 
 
Source: own elaboration from data provided by the Ministry. 
Note: The prices are expressed in euros per litre of fuel. 
Anex II 
 
Figure 6: Price and standard deviation analysis. Diesel (Other cities) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration from data provided by the Ministry. 
Note: The prices are expressed in euros per litre of fuel. 
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